

Russian - Ukrainian War Strategic Repercussions

Abstract

This war is considered the first war since the end of World War II that brought this amount of attention. It goes beyond the war space between two countries - Russia and Ukraine- to reach the United States and its Western alliance entirely. The vast repercussions and effects of the war are significant. They include the economic impact, the state of lack of certainty that prevails in the global system, and the lack of reliance on solid determinants in dealing with this dangerous escalation. They also include what the war has received from the massive, comprehensive media coverage on both sides and the growing debates about international and humanitarian values , particularly regarding human rights and their applications in wars.

These factors make understanding the war and what it will lead to very important, even if the phenomenon itself seems complex and its factors are also complex in the concept of dimensions and levels of influence and influence. Whatever results from this war will result in, it will be of global dimensions, regardless of the size and extent of this impact on different sides and continents.

This focused study is based on an attempt to understand the war and its possible effects and repercussions. It examines and analyzes the motives of direct and indirect actors in the war. It should always be considered that we are studying an ongoing war. Therefore, the variables and their speed control the

nature of the field outputs. The current war has three essential dimensions, and they overlap with each other: military, economic, and political. The study attempts to find Russia's options in managing the war and its possibility of bringing about changes in the global system. It also deals with the most prominent determinants of the results of this significant variable.

The study considers that the Ukrainian-Russian case mainly represents a unique case of contradiction and zero interest; Since independence, two national interests have begun to grow in Ukraine, which is in zero contrast with the Russian interests. The first is the growth of Ukrainian nationalism, and the second is the political orientations of the state. On the Russian side, it is also restricted by determinants in its dealings with the Ukrainian dimension, as Ukraine represents a contradictory strategic depth for Russia and the West. At the same time, the political orientations of the Ukrainian government have become a potential source of threat to the Russian state, especially after the 2014 elections in deciding its orientation toward the West; As Ukraine extends over 1200 km from the Russian border, it is only 300 km from the capital, Moscow.

Such consideration is still prevailing even though Russia has resolved the issue of Crimea by formally annexing it by military force and then by referendum under its supervision. On the other hand, the acceleration in Western and American relations with Ukraine, as Ukraine stripped itself of non-alignment in 2016, and the

Russian - Ukrainian War Strategic Repercussions

increasing efforts of the Ukrainian government to end the presence of Russian tendencies and figures affiliated with Russia in the institutions of government and the army contributed to provoking the Russian side.

Regarding the controversial analyses of the attainable Russian goal to change the world order, it is noticeable that no global political pole has presented itself as an alternative to the existing world order, even Russia itself, throughout the previous eras. The other superpowers do not show that they can rely upon to represent an alternative to the United States system that controls the global system today. Nevertheless, on the other hand, they are also beneficiaries, and their political and economic growth has been under the current world system, particularly concerning both China and Russia.

Despite Russia's opposition to the policies of NATO, it did not take a firm stand against the existence of NATO, and this continued with the change in the Russian leadership, which extends from the era of President Yeltsin to Putin. Russia did not demand the dissolution of NATO on the eve of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, the annexation of new countries to it, even when some Eastern European countries joined, and all Russia requires is to be treated as a party of special status. The Russian leadership felt that it had achieved this goal by signing the Association Agreement with NATO within the "NATO-Russia Council" in 2020 in the era of President Putin.

However, recently, the shift in NATO's strategy at the Prague summit escalated Russia's security concerns, especially concerning the transition from the defense strategy to the preventive strategy of NATO and then to the intervention strategy. Such new policy excluded Russia, especially in the intervention in Libya and the previous announcement of the annexation of the Baltic states, and the announcement that Georgia and Ukraine have an opportunity to join NATO. All such transactions have strained the relationship between Russia and NATO to move it from a state of coexistence seeking the possibility of broader rapprochement to a state of skepticism.

Different positions of the various parties regarding the war are a determinant and central actor in designing its results and outcomes. The most important is the United States of America, which has decided its position towards standing against Russia, its military and economic support for Ukraine, and the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia.

It is believed that the most important goals and motives of the United States policy are to prevent the success of any Russian attempt to change the status of the current world order regardless of the level of change and the possibility of its occurrence. It was depriving Russia of the possibility of restoring its influence in the countries of the former Soviet Union, weakening the Russian strategic, economic, and military capabilities.

Russian - Ukrainian War Strategic Repercussions

The US aims to drain Russia strategically by implicating its army in Ukraine. Such drain would be on all military, politics, and geopolitics, considering the conflicting international trends of the United States' policies. Indeed, the war restored the hegemony of the United States of America over Europe and the spirit of NATO. America achieved a solid blow to the Russian economy at the strategic level. It deepened the hostility between Ukraine and Russia until Russia faced a real strategic enemy in its surroundings and borders. Thus, the United States proved that the world continues to be able to control global decision-making. European countries have adopted a strict and unified stance toward Russia alongside the United States.

Many consider China as one of the most attention-grabbing axes in the Russian-Ukrainian. Such consideration is based on the unique relations with Russia and the recent tensions with the United States. Nevertheless, such assessment has only resulted in its abstention from voting in the Security Council on sanctions against Russia without using its veto in a middle position.

Regarding the repercussions of the war and its effects, the study believes that expecting new global multipolarity is a hasty result of the war's results and lacks scientific accuracy, as Russia has not been able to form a polarity that calls for changing the global system. Moreover, Russia's values do not exceed the values that

control the hegemonic leadership of the current international system; Russia and its current leadership are not socialist but rather a liberal capitalist leadership. On the other hand, no anti-US leadership has yet taken shape. On the contrary, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan adopted neutral positions. It was predominantly trying to take advantage of the outcomes of the war to maximize its gains in its capacity, not as an alliance, bloc, or specific force against the United States' international policies.

The study concludes that the Russian war strategy has developed due to the situation on the battlefield. The battlefield is governed by the size of the Ukrainian resistance, which the Russian leadership was unaware of, and a realistic estimate of its size in its attempt to occupy Ukraine and the coherent and clear European and American position, especially within NATO. Therefore, the Russian leadership no longer seeks to occupy Ukraine as a strategic goal, and Russian military operations are focused on three main goals:

- destroying Ukrainian military capabilities and preventing Ukraine from turning into a nuclear state in the future
- destroying Ukrainian infrastructure and stripping important economic centers from the body of the state
- the division of Ukrainian geography into three regions: Eastern Ukraine, Central, and Western Ukraine, and Crimea.